



H

ORIGINAL

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF HUALAPAI VALLEY SOLAR LLC, IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE	Docket No.: L-00000NN-09-0541- 00151
REQUIREMENTS OF ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES §§ 40-360.03 AND 40-360.06,	Case No. 151
FOR A CERŤĬFICATE OF	
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPATIBILITY	
AUTHORIZING CONSTRUCTION OF THE HVS PROJECT, A 340 MW PARABOLIC	APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO
TROUGH CONCENTRATING SOLAR	REQUEST FOR REVIEW
THERMAL GENERATING FACILITY AND	•
AN ASSOCIATED GEN-TIE LINE	Comparation Commission DC 23
INTERCONNECTING THE GENERATINA ZON	
FACILITY TO THE EXISTING MEAD-	OCKETED AS S
FROEMA JUNE TRANSMISSION LINE,	
THE MEAD-LIBERTY 345kV	LAMB TARREST CO
TRANSMISSION LINE OR THE	→
MOENKOPI-EL DORADO 500kV	AVETERIEV - TIO
TRANSMISSION LINE.	U/// 58 ± 0

Hualapai Valley Solar LLC ("Applicant") provides this Response to Denise Bensusan's Request for Review of the Certificate of Environmental Compatibility ("CEC") granted unanimously by the Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting Committee ("Committee"). The Applicant respectfully requests that the Commission approve the CEC at its next regularly scheduled Open Meeting so that this innovative, jobcreating, renewable energy project can move forward without further delay.

Introduction

Ms. Bensusan claims that she had an absolute right to intervene in this proceeding because she lives in Hualapai Valley and her well is in the same aquifer that wells from the Project would use. As a legal matter, this position is incorrect. Pursuant to the statute governing intervention in line-siting matters, the Committee has discretion on whether to grant intervention to individuals such as Ms. Bensusan.



As a practical matter, Ms. Bensusan's position is untenable as well. Her well is one of over 800 wells in this aquifer. *See* Table B-1 of Appendix B-1 to the Application. If every well owner had the right to intervene, Arizona's siting process would become an unmanageable bureaucratic morass. Any competitive advantage the State of Arizona might have over other states to site renewable power plants would evaporate, as the federal NEPA process and other states' siting processes would be models of efficiency and good governance by comparison.

Perhaps recognizing the likely outcome that the Commission will conclude that the Committee has the discretion to deny her intervention, Ms. Bensusan also asks the Commission to find that all members of the Committee abused their discretion in this case. This argument is also without merit. The Committee members' decision was thoughtful, considerate, well-documented and reasonable. Furthermore, the Committee addressed all of her material concerns during the course of the hearing even though she was not granted intervention status.

Background

On November 23, 2009, the Applicant filed an application for a CEC authorizing construction of the Hualapai Valley Solar Project, a 340 MW parabolic trough concentrating solar thermal generating facility and an associated gen-tie line (power plant and gen-tie collectively called the "Project"), located in Mohave County.

The Committee held a public hearing on January 12 and January 13, 2010, in Kingman, Arizona. The Applicant called five witnesses and the Committee called six more, including two individuals who had requested intervention (Ms. Bensusan and Ms. Susan Bayer) and two officials (the City of Kingman Mayor and the Mohave County Manager) specifically to address the concerns of Ms. Bensusan and Ms. Bayer. In addition, thirty-seven individuals provided public comment, including three who were listed as witnesses by Ms. Bensusan. At the conclusion of a detailed evidentiary hearing,

2163799.1



the Committee voted unanimously to grant a CEC for the Project. The Project as approved by the Committee will be the first commercial-scale solar project in Mohave County, and will likely be the first commercial-scale solar project in the country to use effluent for a majority of its cooling purposes.

On January 21, 2010, the Applicant requested that the Committee reconsider the question of whether to grant intervenor status to Ms. Bensusan and Ms. Bayer. To Applicant's knowledge, the proactive effort made by the Applicant to accommodate a requested intervenor has no precedent in proceedings before the Committee.

In an open meeting held January 27, the Committee, by a unanimous 10-0 vote, denied the request to reconsider the intervention requests of Ms. Bensusan and Ms. Bayer after thorough and thoughtful consideration. Her Request for Review now asks the Commission to overturn the Committee's unanimous decision to grant the Applicant a CEC although Ms. Bensusan herself did not request that the Committee reconsider its decision to deny her intervention.²

Discussion

I. Ms. Bensusan was not entitled to intervene as a matter of right.

In support of her argument that she was entitled to intervene, Ms. Bensusan argues that a state court rule of procedure trumps an otherwise applicable state statute, simply because she claims a direct and substantial interest in the proceeding.

Her arguments lack merit.

¹ In its January 21, 2010, request, the Applicant also asked the Committee to ratify the legal action made to grant the CEC, which the Committee subsequently did in an Open Meeting held on February 11, 2010. Neither Ms. Bensusan in her request for review, nor any other individual, has raised questions concerning the validity of the ratification process.

² Pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-360.07.A, Ms. Bensusan lacks standing to request review. The appropriate avenue for her to seek relief would be to file for an amendment, pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-252 once the CEC is granted by the Commission. While this might appear cumbersome at first, it is the only lawful approach and the only way to accomplish Ms. Bensusan's alternative requested relief to modify the CEC subject to the condition that the matter be reopened.

matter be reopene

2163799.1



A. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-360.05, individuals do not have the right to intervene.

Section 40-360.05(A) is the controlling authority on whether intervention in proceedings before the Committee is as a matter of right or discretionary. It states:

A. The parties to a certification proceeding shall include:

1. The applicant.

2. Each county and municipal government and state agency interested in the proposed site that has filed with the chairman of the committee, not less than ten days before the date set for the hearing, a notice of intent to be a party.

3. Any domestic nonprofit corporation or association formed in whole or in part to promote conservation or natural beauty, to protect the environment, personal health or other biological values, to preserve historical sites, to promote consumer interests, to represent commercial and industrial groups, or to promote the orderly development of the areas in which the facilities are to be located, that has filed with the chairman of the committee, not less than ten days before the date set for the hearing, a notice of intent to be a party.

4. Such other persons as the committee or hearing officer may at

any time deem appropriate.

Under the plain terms of this statute, county and municipal governments (subsection A.2); state agencies (subsection A.2); and certain domestic nonprofits (subsection A.3) have the right to intervene. Intervention by all others is at the Committee's discretion, if the Committee deems it appropriate (subsection A.4).

Despite the plain terms of the statute, Ms. Bensusan argues that Rule 24(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure provides the right to intervene to anyone who claims an interest relating to the application. During the Committee's deliberation of the request for reconsideration, Committee Member Jessica Youle succinctly explained why that argument was untenable:

I also am extremely troubled with the concept that every citizen should have, has party status of right. It seems to me even from a statutory construction perspective, that would totally negate the necessity to have a section like 40-360.05. So you might as well be voiding this entire statute....I believe the statute is clear, that it is discretionary action by the Committee, and to have otherwise, as I say, would be repealing the statute. Reconsideration Tr. at 29:23-30:8.



As the Committee properly held, it is black letter law that reviewing bodies must give effect to the "unambiguously expressed intent" of the statute's drafters. *See Chevron* v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). Here, the statute is clear. The Committee has the discretion to grant or deny intervention for individuals such as Ms. Bensusan.

B. Ms. Bensusan did not have a direct and substantial interest in the proceeding.

Additionally, even if Rule 24(a) applied, Ms. Bensusan's claims that she has a direct and substantial interest are not supported by her testimony or her statements to the Committee. To the contrary, Ms. Bensusan's interests are not direct and substantial.

She has just one of the over 800 wells that are within the aquifer at issue. *See* Table B-1 of Appendix B-1 to the Application. Additionally, her unsupported statement that she is one of the closest landowners to the Project is in fact contradicted by the record. Her well, located in Township 24 N, Range 16 W, is two townships (roughly 12 miles) removed from the Project, and there are dozens, if not hundreds of wells, located closer to the Project than hers. *See* Figure 1 and Table B-1 of Appendix B-1 to the Application.

In her testimony, Ms. Bensusan noted, "we can learn from California." Tr. at 456:6. This is one statement with which all can agree. Replicating California's siting process by allowing anyone claiming an interest to intervene is not in the interest of the public, CEC applicants, the Committee, or the Commission.

II. The Committee did not abuse its discretion when it denied intervention.

Because Ms. Bensusan was not entitled to intervene, her only remaining argument is that the Committee erred by not granting her permissive intervention. To prevail on this argument, Ms. Bensusan must show that the Committee abused its discretion when it denied her request. *See Harris v. State*, 198 Ariz. 444, 11 P.3d 403, 408 (App. 2000) ("The standard of review for the denial of permissive intervention is abuse of discretion").



Ms. Bensusan faces a high hurdle in attempting to argue that each Committee member abused his or her discretion in denying intervention. Under Arizona law, to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Bensusan would have to show that the Committee's actions were "manifestly unreasonable" or that the Committee's discretion was "exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." *Quigley v. City Court of the City of Tucson*, 132 Ariz. 35, 37 (App. 1992). Furthermore, it is not enough that the Commission might have ruled differently if it had been faced with the same question initially. A reviewing tribunal may not substitute its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal. *Id*; *see also*, *Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles*, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing abuse of discretion review as "limited and deferential").

In this case, the Committee provided clear, reasoned justifications for why intervention was not granted and worked diligently to accommodate the testimony and concerns of Ms. Bensusan.

A. The Committee's decision was reasonable.

During the Committee's consideration of the request to reconsider, the Committee members fully explained their decision. For example, Committee Member Mike Palmer explained:

This Committee and the evidentiary process was conceived and authorized by the legislature almost 30 years ago, and the intent was to create a mechanism by which conditions are imposed on the siting of power plants and transmission lines that would mitigate environmental impact; and our task was to gather as much information as possible to achieve that objective. This Committee is comprised of five former legislators, five attorneys. It's a distinguished body, certainly able to perform that task....

We have enough folks here on this panel, on this Committee to act as cross-examiners on witnesses from the Applicant and from any other intervenors....

So I chose not to second the motion because I didn't see an advantage that we would gain.... [We] gave them the opportunity to testify and be on the record. And I thought that was sufficient. Reconsideration Tr. at 27:11-28:20.



Commission Chairman Designee David Eberhart stated:

My impression was that they [Ms. Bensusan and the other individual who had requested intervention status] were allowed a significant amount of time to present the information they had....

So I agree with you that I think that there was little more that could have been added that would have been significant on the record. Reconsideration Tr. at 35:14-22.

Similarly, Committee Member Barry Wong, who originally moved to grant intervention status, stated:

I think there was a full vetting of the witnesses. I felt comfortable following the denial of [my] intervention motion that there was a very detailed cross-examination of all the witnesses....

So even though at the time I think it would have been fair to include them as intervenors, I think now after the fact, I'm not sure how much more information we can receive. Reconsideration Tr. at 23:17-33:3.

The Committee's discretion allows it to counterbalance the importance of citizen participation with the need to efficiently manage its proceedings. *See California Trout v. FERC*, 572 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that FERC's denial of intervention was not abuse of discretion) ("Agencies must have the ability to manage their own dockets and set reasonable limitations on the processes by which interested persons can support or contest proposed actions."); *see also Venegas v. Skaggs*, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1989) (Permissive intervention "necessarily vests discretion in the district court to determine the fairest and most efficient method of handling a case." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Under any fair reading of the record in this case, the Committee's action cannot be characterized as "manifestly unreasonable" or "untenable." To the contrary, the Committee's actions in this case were very reasonable and well within its authority.

///

. || ///

///

///



B. The Committee addressed all of Ms. Bensusan's concerns that were material and nonrepetitive.

Even though Ms. Bensusan was not granted intervention status, the Committee allowed her ample opportunity to provide sworn testimony and raise material, nonrepetitive concerns.³

As Committee Member Gregg Houtz explained, once Ms. Bensusan raised concerns during her testimony, "Committee members have had a history of listening to those questions and maybe re-asking them in a different form." Tr. at 17:12-13. Similarly, Committee Member Wong informed Ms. Bensusan that she could:

present your information and evidence, written and verbal, and you can raise the issues to us, and then we have the option to then ask those questions or some form of them at our discretion to the parties, even though you don't have a right formally to cross-examine other witnesses. Tr. at 18:1-7.

That is exactly what the Committee did in this case. Ms. Bensusan's testimony lasted over one hour, longer than the testimony of the Applicant's environmental witnesses. The Committee carefully considered her concerns, asked follow up questions of the Applicant, and imposed conditions designed to address her concerns and the other individual who testified.

According to her request for review, Ms. Bensusan's primary concerns related to: (1) impacts to the Hualapai aquifer; (2) dry cooling; (3) Mohave County's approval process; (4) impacts on wildlife; and (5) flood control and drainage concerns.

To address concerns about impacts to the aquifer, the Committee imposed conditions 4 and 24 in the CEC, which read as follows:

³ One example of an immaterial argument is Ms. Bensusan's claim that nearby residents would file for compensation under Proposition 207 because granting the CEC would diminish the value of neighboring properties. *See* Committee Ex. BEN-1. As codified in statute, however, Proposition 207 exempts land use laws that "[e]stablish locations for utility facilities" or that "[d]o not directly regulate an owner's land." § 12-1134(B)(5), (6).



	l
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	l
19	
20	١
21	
22	
23	
24	١

26

- 4. The Applicant shall make all reasonable efforts to minimize the use of groundwater during construction and operation of the Project, and use effluent for cooling and all other non-potable water uses to the extent it is made available by the City of Kingman from its Hilltop Waste Water Treatment Plant ("WWTP") and can be transported by the Applicant and at the Applicant's expense to the Project site. The Applicant may utilize groundwater for potable uses and as a back-up to effluent when effluent is not available from the City of Kingman or when transmission of the effluent is interrupted from the Hilltop WWTP to the Project. Total water use per year shall not exceed 3,000 AF from all sources and shall not exceed 2,400 AF of groundwater for cooling purposes. The Applicant, within two years from the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") approval of the Certificate, shall contract with the City of Kingman for sale, transmission and use of effluent generated by the Hilltop WWTP. If contracting is unsuccessful in this time frame, the Applicant may apply to the Commission for an extension of time to negotiate the contract.
- 24. The Applicant also shall file annual reports with Docket Control and the Compliance Officer of the Commission, and with the Arizona Department of Water Resources stating the total amount of water used in the operation of the Project, including the amount of groundwater. Annual reports of water usage shall begin with commencement of commercial operation of the Project and continue for the life of the Project.

To address specific concerns raised about wildlife impacts, the Committee imposed Condition 16:

16. All lighting shall be shielded, cantered or cut to ensure that light reaches only areas needing illumination.

The Committee also fully vetted Ms. Bensusan's other concerns, asking questions about:

Dry cooling, see, e.g.:

- Committee Member Gregg Houtz: Mr. Campbell, when your witness comes and discusses the dry cooling, I hope that there is also discussion of wet/dry hybrid cooling. Tr. at 34:2-4.
- Member Houtz:
 - Q: Mr. LaRow, you talk about the higher capital costs for dry cooling and you said two to three times greater?
 - A: Applicant Witness Mike LaRow: Yes. Tr. at 167:22-25
- Committee Member William Mundell: Could you quantify -- you said there was a 7 to 9 percent penalty using dry cooling over wet cooling. Do you have some dollar figures to quantify that? Tr. at 178:10-13.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

	Mem	her	Mun	dell:
•	TATCIN	nei	1 71 UII	utu.

Q. And then you talked about dry cooling. I mean, isn't there a gas dry cooling facility in southern Nevada?

A. Applicant Witness Greg Bartlett: Yeah. At Nevada Solar One, if you know that CSP plant, nearby that is an El Dorado plant that's a, I believe natural gas, combined cycle, runs 24 hours a day, and it is dry cooled.

Q. Right. Because you talked about the Solar One. But as I said, there's also a gas dry cooling facility, and that runs 24 hours a day. So to Member Houtz's question, it's a base load plant then? Tr. at 179:10-19.

Mohave County's approval process, see, e.g.:

Committee Member Wong:

Q: Mr. Walker, you're the county manager; is that correct?

A: Committee Witness Ron Walker: That's correct, sir.

Q: You attended all of the public hearings relative to this project; is that correct?

A: I attended all of the board of supervisors public hearings.

Q: At any time during those hearings was there an opportunity for public input regarding water usage, and more specifically groundwater usage?

A: Yes, sir. Tr. at 52:22-53:7.

Committee Member Mundell:

Q: The county does have some -- quite a bit of impact on water usage by the type of zoning they approve. Would you agree with that statement?

A: Mr. Walker: I would agree, sir. Tr. at 58:25-59:3.

Member Mundell:

Q: And then just to make sure I'm clear on your testimony, the amount of water usage, based on your understanding, that the plant will use will be less than what would have occurred if the residential development had come to fruition?

A: Mr. Walker: It's our understanding if the residential development went to its full potential buildout that the water usage for that would be higher than what it's going to be proposed for this plant. Tr. at 60:12-20.

Flood control and drainage, see, e.g.:

Committee Member Patricia Noland:

Q: Mr. Chairman, Mr. LaRow, would you not have to apply for and -- I believe it was mentioned by the county manager -- obtain permits that would deal with the floodplain?

A: Mike LaRow: Absolutely. Absolutely. Tr. at 176:23-177:2.



• Committee Member Wong: what are the statistics about rainfall and runoff and drainage? Can you talk about that and how it impacts that project site?" Tr. at 316:10-12.

In summary, all of Ms. Bensusan's material and nonrepetitive concerns were fully vetted by the Committee. As noted by Committee Member Eberhart:

My impression was that they were allowed a significant amount of time to present the information they had. I don't believe they were cut short. I think that ... the Committee asked a significant amount of questions of the Applicant, and I think we established a thorough record of the project. Reconsideration Tr. at 35:14-19.

As further explained by Committee Member Wong:

....I think that the ladies did present their evidence, had the time, and they presented it to this Committee.

The Committee members then took the liberty to synthesize that information and pose questions to the witnesses, posed by the Applicant. Speaking for myself, I did that. The information that I received from Bensusan and Bayer allowed me to cross-examine, I think, quite thoroughly all the Applicant's witnesses. Reconsideration Tr. at 53:2-10.

Similarly, Committee Member Paul Rasmussen stated:

...the two women who were asking for intervenor status were given full opportunity before any votes were taken on the CEC to express their concerns, to articulate them fully after a very robust and detailed discussion had taken place on the merits of the case.... And so then in a practical sense, I think all of the facts were laid out before this panel, and they were fully considered when we took the votes that we did. Reconsideration Tr. at 29:2-19.

Conclusion

The Applicant is participating in the highly competitive world of commercial-scale solar power development. Permitting delays equate to competitive disadvantages, financial hardships, and ultimately can mean the death of a Project. While that outcome might be acceptable to, and even lauded by, project opponents, it would not be in the interest of the many citizens of Mohave County who want to see this innovative Project move forward and provide needed jobs and renewable power as soon as possible.



Accordingly, the Applicant respectfully requests that, at the next regularly scheduled Open Meeting, the Commission review and approve the thoughtful, considered, and fair decision made by the Committee to grant a CEC for this important Project.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of March, 2010.

LEWIS AND ROCA LLP

6

1

2

3

4

5

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1920

21

22

2324

25

26

Thomas H. Campbell Albert H. Acken 40 N. Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Attorneys for Hualapai Valley Solar LLC (602) 262-5723 (Tel.)

(602) 262-5723 (161.) (602) 734-3841 (Fax)

ORIGINAL and thirteen (13) copies of the foregoing filed this 10th day of March, 2010, with:

The Arizona Corporation Commission Utilities Division – Docket Control 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

COPY of the foregoing hand-delivered this 10th day of March, 2010, to:

John Foreman, Chairman Arizona Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting Committee Office of the Attorney General

1275 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Chairman Kristin K. Mayes Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Commissioner Gary Pierce Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007



1	
2	Commissioner Paul Newman Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street
3	Phoenix, Arizona 85007
4	Commissioner Sandra D. Kenned
5	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007
6	
7	Commissioner Bob Stump Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street
8	Phoenix, Arizona 85007
9	Giancarlo Estrada
10	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007
11	·
12	John LeSueur Arizona Corporation Commission
13	1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007
14	Nancy LaPlaca
15	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007
16	
17	Cristina Arzaga-Williams Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street
18	Phoenix, Arizona 85007
19	Amanda Ho
20	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007
21	
22	Janice Alward, Chief Counsel Arizona Corporation Commissior 1200 W. Washington Street
23	Phoenix, Arizona 85007
24	
25	



COPY of the foregoing served via electronic mail this 10th day of March, 2010, to: Susan A. Moore-Bayer 7656 West Abrigo Drive Golden Valley, Arizona 86413 Denise Herring-Bensusan 4811 E. Calle Bill Kingman, Arizona 86409 Timothy M. Hogan 202 E. McDowell Rd., Suite 153 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Attorneys for Denis Bensusan Israel G. Torres Torres Consulting and Law Group LLC 209 E. Baseline Road Suite E-102 Tempe, Arizona 85283